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Abstract 
 
During most of the period from 1912 to 1936, Guangdong Province was independent from 
the central government. The local authorities there were facing a dilemma regarding opium, 
as others were elsewhere in China. On the one hand, opium was considered the symbol of 
China’s weakness, and its suppression was a top priority; on the other hand, opium taxes 
represented an indispensable source of fiscal income. Some Guangdong power holders were 
truly committed to a suppression agenda, especially from 1913 to 1924. During this period, 
with the exception of a brief interlude from 1915 to 1916, opium laws were prohibition laws. 
Even if these laws were not always enforced with full vigor, the drug remained illegal in 
Guangdong. After 1924, opium was legalized, and the authorities openly ruled an opium 
monopoly. They came out with increasingly comprehensive regulations, which proved 
successful in increasing opium revenues. Yet, as this article makes clear, there was nothing 
like direct government control: traditional tax-farming arrangements with local opium 
merchants (though under stricter supervision) remained the backbone of the monopoly. The 
article also pays attention to the influence of the Six-Year Plan (1935–1940) launched by the 
Nanking government. As a credible set of suppression laws, it appealed to the Guangdong 
progressive elites who were hostile to opium. They urged the local autocrat Chen Jitang to 
take similar action. Chen made attempts to launch his own plans for suppressing opium, but 
they were unconvincing and nothing concrete came out of them. This article suggests that, in 
order to obtain a better understanding of how easily Chen Jitang was driven out of power in 
the summer of 1936, it is necessary to take into account the significant contribution of the 
Six-Year Plan in undermining his legitimacy. 
 
Keywords: Opium, Republican China, Guangdong, Six-Year Plan, Nanjing, Chen Jitang 
 
Introduction 
The Xinzheng period (1901–1911) and the Republican period (1912–1949) were both 
characterized by ambitious attempts to reform the Chinese legal system. Scholarly research 
on this topic is distinguished by a strong focus on the reform efforts of the central 
governments (Qing, Beiyang, and Guomindang) (Bernhardt and Huang 1994; Huang 2001; 
Bourgon 2004; Xu 2008; Tran 2009). Despite the long period of marked political 
fragmentation (1916–1928), and despite the fact that political reunification following the 
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Beifa (Northern Expedition) remained incomplete, laws enacted in the parts of China 
enjoying autonomy from the central government are still understudied. 
The existing scholarship on opium laws during the Republic is fairly consistent with 
this general trend.1 A steady stream of writing on the topic of “opium politics” over the past 
two decades (Zhu, Jiang, and Zhang 1995; Wang Hongbin 1997; Slack 2001; Wang Jinxiang 
2005; Baumler 2007) has illuminated the actions of the central government during this time. 
It is thus acknowledged that anti-opium action was an important part of the Xinzheng. 
Drawing on the elite consensus that it was necessary to eradicate opium,2 the Qing dynasty 
took action by launching the Ten-Year Plan in 1906. The plan was presented in the edict of 
September 20, which was followed by the publication of more matter-of-fact instructions on 
November 1 (Ma 1998, 399–401). The plan and subsequent instructions called for a gradual 
eradication of poppy planting over a period of ten years. In addition, smokers were subjected 
to a census; they received smoking licenses and had to gradually give up smoking. Opium 
houses were to close within six months, after which opium was to be purchased in carefully 
monitored shops for home consumption only. To set an example, officials were required to 
quit smoking within a six-month period. At the same time, the Qing signed two agreements 
with Great Britain in 1907 and 1911 that stated principally that India should diminish its 
exports of opium to China each year in proportion with the annual decrease in production of 
opium in China (Yu 1934, 259–261). 
Despite encountering enormous difficulties, the Ten-Year Plan yielded impressive 
results, which were acknowledged even by the English.3 The new central government 
maintained a commitment to opium suppression during the first years of the Republic, but 
after the collapse of the central power in 1916, China witnessed a revival of opium 
production and consumption. The Guomindang decided to take steps against opium in the 
mid-1930s, and its achievements regarding opium suppression (as a result of the 1935–1940 
Six-Year Plan) have recently been reevaluated (Wang Hongbin 1997, 417–450; Zhu, Jiang, 
and Zhang 1995, 356–407; Baumler 2007, 228–230; Slack 2001, 104–154). Yet the opium 
politics of local power holders are still relegated to cursory references. Even if scholarship 
relating to opium acknowledges some exceptions,4 local power holders are in general tagged 
as “warlords” and described as bullies eager to seize any occasion to derive profit from 
opium (Yu 1934, 198; Wang Hongbin 1997, 369–376). No serious attention has been paid to 
the opium legislation these local officials promulgated; instead, this legislation has generally 
been considered cynically, as a smokescreen or, worse, a means of extortion (an often-told 
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story is that of the “lazy taxes” that were imposed on farmers if they did not grow poppies) 
(Baumler 2007, 90–92; Wang Jinxiang 2005, 106–107). 
Taking Guangdong as an example, this article’s main contention is that local opium 
laws deserve the same serious attention as those enacted by the central government. The 
period from 1912 to 1936 was chosen because, during most of these years, Guangdong 
Province was independent from the central government. This study reveals, first, that genuine 
and coherent attempts at eradicating opium did not only emanate from the central 
government. Laws concerned with maximizing opium profit were not necessarily associated 
with warlord-type regimes; some Guangdong power holders (warlords among them) were 
truly committed to a suppression agenda, even as they enjoyed de facto independence. When 
one considers this twenty-four-year period, the general reluctance toward legalizing opium is 
striking and encompasses both warlords and non-warlords. In every case, opium legalization 
was decided out of pragmatism, because its resources were badly needed in a highly 
competitive political environment. 
The year 1924 stands as a watershed. From 1913 to 1924 (except during a brief 
interlude from 1915 to 1916), opium laws were prohibition laws. Even if they were not 
always enforced with full vigor, the drug remained illegal. But from 1924 on, legalization 
was taken for granted, and the authorities became concerned with finding appropriate ways to 
manage opium distribution while minimizing the political cost of legalization. 
 
Prohibition in Question (1912–1923) 
 Under the aegis of Hu Hanmin, Guangdong became a stronghold of the 
revolutionaries as early as November 1911. The revolutionaries, like the central government 
of the time, were committed to eradicating opium. Regulations prohibiting opium starting on 
January 1, 1913, were promulgated, making 1912 a transitional year.5 In August 1912, the 
opium administration was put under the management of the Guangdong Police Department 
and its notoriously energetic head, Chen Jinghua.6 Anti-opium regulations were strictly 
enforced up to the end of the revolutionaries’ rule over Guangdong7 in August 1913, when 
Yuan Shikai’s protégé Long Jiguang succeeded in expelling the Guomindang. Long declared 
his commitment to an anti-opium policy and, for one and a half years, he stuck to this 
position.8 Yet there are reasons to believe that in 1914 he started to derive some profit from 
opium by establishing traffic with his native province, Yunnan (where poppy culture was 
gradually resuming) with his brother, Long Yuguang, acting as an intermediary.9 Still, Long 
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Jiguang refrained from “crossing the Rubicon” of legalization until 1915, when he was given 
what he probably regarded as too good an opportunity to refuse. 
 
Long Jiguang as Forerunner: The 1915 Monopoly 
Articles 3 and 4 of the 1911 Anglo-Chinese agreements stated that every Chinese 
province freed of domestic opium and duly inspected by a team of British officials would be 
closed to imports of Indian opium. Many provinces were affected by these terms in the early 
years of the Republic, and soon only three provinces remained open to Indian opium: 
Guangdong, Jiangxi, and Jiangsu. But even there, local regulations made the consumption of 
opium impossible. At the same time, in Shanghai and Hong Kong, big stocks of Indian opium 
were still piled up. According to the 1911 agreements, these inventories could be legally sold 
on Chinese territory.10 A solution had to be found. In April 1915, Yuan Shikai appointed Cai 
Naihuang as special commissioner for the suppression of opium in Guangdong, Jiangxi, and 
Jiangsu (Wang Hongbin 1997, 361). An agreement between Cai Naihuang and the merchants 
who held the Hong Kong stocks was signed in October 1915: HK$3,500 would go to the 
central government coffers along with HK$600 to Long Jiguang’s pocket for each of the 
twelve hundred opium chests purchased by an ad hoc organization, the Yaogao jiancha 
zongsuo (Medical Paste Inspection Bureau), which was granted the right to sell opium in 
Guangdong.11 It soon turned out, however, that the Yaogao jiancha zongsuo (which was 
under Long’s control) was unwilling to buy the twelve hundred chests as it was supposed to. 
Instead, it turned to relatively cheap Yunnan opium, thereby deriving much higher profit 
margins. 
No matter the kind of opium it was selling, a monopoly was put into place. Astutely, 
Long had used the agreement as an excuse to launch a monopoly allegedly to solve the 
pending problem of the Hong Kong stocks of Indian opium. Moreover, the agreement was 
signed by an envoy of the central government. The next year, in a characteristic show of 
cynicism, Long declared independence from the central government on April 6, 1916 and 
assassinated Cai Naihuang on April 24, charging him with establishing the monopoly.12 
It is worth mentioning that many features of the Long Jiguang monopoly emulated the 
Ten-Year Plan. This is true of its allegedly temporary nature, as it was meant to last only 
eighteen months, the time deemed necessary for selling out the stock of Indian opium. Also, 
smoking houses were forbidden, and permits (available only to old, ill, or inveterate smokers) 
were required to be granted the right to smoke. But this monopoly was unique as well—its 
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most notorious innovation being the use of euphemisms. For example, instead of “opium,” 
the Yaogao jiancha zongsuo used the eponym “medicine paste” (yaogao ??), as the opium 
contained a substance that would allegedly ease withdrawal. Long Jiguang opened a path for 
future Guangdong monopolies, which would generally claim to be temporary and require 
permits. The word “opium” (yapian ??) rarely appeared explicitly. For example, prepared 
opium would instead be called “detoxification medicine” (jieyan yaopin ????)13 or 
“detoxification paste” (jieyan yaogao ????),14 and raw opium would be labeled “raw 
material for detoxification medicine” (jieyan yaoliao ????) (figure 1).15 
 
Figure 1. Early 1930s certification stamp for raw opium (jieyanyao yinhua) under the 
Guangdong jinyanju (Guangdong Opium Suppression Bureau). Source: GA, series 95/1, file 
639 (Kowloon maritime customs). 
 
Prohibition Becomes a Dead Issue (1916–1923) 
In July 1916, the old Guangxi clique (Lu Rongting, Chen Bingkun, and Mo Rongxin) 
expelled Long Jiguang. The clique tried to use Sun Yat-sen as a way to enhance his 
legitimacy, but Sun realized he was deprived of any real power and left for Shanghai in the 
spring of 1918. The Yaogao jiancha zongsuo was disbanded under the old Guangxi clique, 
which reverted back to its pre-1915 position: no legal status was granted to opium, but the 
clique profited through its involvement with an underground trade (Hosoi 1919, 49). Under 
these circumstances, the consumption of opium remained limited, as it had been in 1913 and 
1914. The old Guangxi clique (which dared to lift the ban on fantan, a gambling game of 
particularly infamous repute, and farmed out its revenues), considered that the taboo 
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remained too great in the case of opium (Judu zhoukan 1(2): 2 [October 23, 1920]; Wei 1963, 
66). 
Chen Jiongming, one of the former leaders of the 1911 revolution in Guangdong,16 
succeeded in gathering troops in South Fujian and recovered control of Guangdong in 
November 1920. Somehow, reluctantly, he accepted Sun Yat-sen’s patronage. As soon as he 
regained control over Guangdong, Chen Jiongming demonstrated his commitment to fighting 
opium. In an early 1921 proclamation, he emphasized that Long Jiguang and the old Guangxi 
clique had unleashed the scourge of opium, and he declared a strict prohibition against 
planting, transporting, selling, or smoking the substance (Guangdong qunbao, January 11, 
1921). He would stick to this position for the rest of his time as a power holder in 
Guangdong.17 
In June 1922, Sun Yat-sen’s prioritization of national reunification by way of a 
military expedition led to a clash with the federalist-oriented Chen, whose major concern was 
Guangdong’s development and prosperity. Chen led a surprise attack on Sun’s headquarters; 
Sun narrowly escaped death and fled to Shanghai.18 Six months later, a motley band of 
mercenary troops regained control of Canton in the name of Sun, and Chen Jiongming’s 
forces took refuge in the eastern part of Guangdong. Many of Sun’s troops were from other 
provinces and hence were earmarked as “guest troops” (kejun ?军). Some were powerful 
enough to be a threat to the Guomindang, in particular the twenty-three thousand Yunnanese 
troops under the leadership of Yang Ximin (Chereparov 1982, 25). 
 
The Creation of the Opium Suppression Superintendent’s Office (Jinyan dubanshu) 
Sun Yat-sen’s Late 1923 Dilemma 
Despite a commitment against opium that was beyond doubt (Wang Jinxiang 2005, 
118–127), Sun Yat-sen was driven to the conclusion that a policy of prohibition in 
Guangdong was inappropriate. To understand this seeming contradiction, multiple factors 
have to be taken into account. 
The general context for Sun’s decision was one of a revival of opium production and 
consumption in the rest of the country. With the legalization of opium in 1915 by Long 
Jiguang, Guangdong had been remarkably precocious. However, by late 1923 it remained one 
of the last provinces to effectively enforce prohibition. Anti-opium idealism therefore led to a 
critical weakening, because almost every other power in China profited from opium.19 
Moreover, the political environment was markedly competitive at both the national level and 
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in Guangdong Province. During 1923, Sun Yat-sen’s mercenary allies proved to be inveterate 
smugglers of opium as a way to derive profit and pay their troops. The troops from Yunnan—
because of the strong connections they had with their native province, where opium 
production was rampant—were especially notorious in this regard (China Weekly Review, 
March 10, 1923; August 25, 1923). For Sun, it was the worst possible situation: not only was 
prohibition an empty word, but opium was profiting his enemies as well as his troublesome 
allies (potential rivals themselves) instead of himself.20 The time had come for realpolitik. 
 In the instruction Sun gave to the newly nominated jinyan duban (opium suppression 
superintendent), Yang Xiyan, on December 17, 1923, Sun stated that prohibition was useless 
because smuggling was so widespread, and he connected the issue of legalization to the 
process of state building, claiming that “prohibition through taxation” (yujinyuzheng ???
?) would have the advantage of providing money for the Beifa.21 
The reason that Sun Yat-sen did not simply follow the path of some of his 
predecessors (like the old Guangxi clique), and profit from opium revenues without making it 
legal, is that opium legalization was embedded in a strategy of state building. In the short run, 
the creation of the role of opium suppression superintendent was aimed at depriving the guest 
troops of their power. In the long run, it was part of an effort to rationalize and centralize tax 
collection. 
Yet there was nationwide consensus during the whole of the Republican era about the 
need to eradicate opium. Nobody dared suggest that opium might be acceptable to any 
extent.22 Opium had been made even more infamous since the warlord era: the connection 
between the rule of warlords and the legalization of opium for profit was often pointed out 
(Minguo ribao, December 28, 1922; January 29, 1923).23 As a consequence, legalizing the 
drug was not only against Sun’s personal convictions but also had a genuine cost in terms of 
political legitimacy, especially since the Guomindang was claiming to be a progressive and 
revolutionary force. In that regard, it is important to pay attention to the way opium laws 
were written and made public. 
The case of the opium prohibition rules (jinyan tiaoli ????) promulgated by Sun 
Yat-sen on January 16, 1924, is especially interesting: the document reads more or less like 
the outline of a prohibition policy. Article 2 states that “all the arrangements regarding opium 
suppression” (yiqie jinyan shiyi ?????? i.e., opium management) are to be supervised 
by the jinyan duban. Then, the great majority of its twenty-two articles are devoted to stating 
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the punishments for opium smokers (Article 13), for people opening opium houses (Article 
14), boiling and planting opium (Articles 11–12), and so on. One has to read between the 
lines that opium (yapian ??) in this context actually means smuggled opium. Only one 
article (Article 7) is actually devoted to legal opium, euphemistically called “detoxification 
medicine” (jieyan yaopin ???? ) (Ma 1998, 763). To gain insight into the real 
management of the jinyan dubanshu, it is necessary to refer to the various regulations issued 
by the successive duban during the following months.24 (However, their main concern was 
not so much the inner organization of the monopoly as contraband.)25 
As a consequence, the legal apparatus during this period was based on a dichotomy. 
On the one hand, a law was published by the highest authority stating the overall principles of 
the opium policy (quite deceiving, as it was in the eyes of a layman taking the shape of a 
policy of suppression). On the other hand, a flow of regulations dealing with the day-to-day 
management of opium was published whenever it was deemed necessary by the opium 
administration itself. These regulations, being of a more technical and matter-of-fact nature, 
provide insight into the way the opium system was actually managed.26 The authorities were, 
however, reluctant to publicize these kinds of regulations, and the press only sporadically 
published them, making them harder to screen out. 
 
A New Deal (June 1925) 
However confusing its formulation, the 1924 legalization was a watershed, as opium 
would remain legal until 1936. A proclamation of immediate prohibition was published on 
June 20, 1925, in the outbreak of enthusiasm following the victory of the Guomindang over 
the rebellion of its most troublesome partners (Yang Ximin and his ally Liu Zhenhuan, the 
chief of the Guangxi forces), but it turned out to be a flash in the pan (Guangzhou minguo 
ribao, June 22, 1925; June 23, 1925). Nonetheless, the victory over Yang and Liu opened a 
new area. It made the party tighten its grip over Guangdong (and the situation would improve 
further by the end of the year, as the eastern part of Guangdong, which had remained under 
the domination of Chen Jiongming, was taken). 
In the context of such an improved political situation, new jinyan tiaoli were 
promulgated on August 1, 1925 (Ma 1998, 802–804). These rules were innovative in several 
aspects. First, the regulations featured a long preamble (under the heading liyou ? 
[justification]), in which the evils of opium are exposed at length (it is a social plague; it is 
the cause of China’s present state of weakness; and so on). It also stated that Yang Ximin and 
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Liu Zhenhuan should be held responsible for the de facto situation of unrestrained 
consumption.27 This interpretation offered great possibilities: the situation regarding opium 
was acknowledged as bad, but this was supposed to be the result of preceding evildoers. 
Because of the number of people addicted to opium, the next logical step was to put 
into force a policy of gradual suppression by issuing permits (in the same manner as the Ten-
Year Plan) over a period of four years. Molding the regulations into the shape of a plan 
organized within a yearly time frame was not only a way to postpone effective suppression or 
to mimic the Ten-Year Plan. In Republican politics, planning meant modernity, science, and 
progress and was considered no less than a political panacea.28 The distinctive appeal of 
planned regulations dated back to the Xinzheng period,29 with the Nine-Year Plan for the 
formation of a parliament launched in 1908 (Rhoads 2000, 129). Later, the Soviet experience 
of economic planning further reinforced the interest of the Chinese intellectual and political 
elite in this approach.30 
With the goal of securing a better grip over opium revenues, the jinyan duban was put 
under the Ministry of Finance, an innovation that lasted. Over the years, the name of the 
opium administration (which changed many times) sometimes reflected the affiliation with 
the Ministry of Finance: for example, from September 1928 to July 1929, the administration 
was named Guangdong caizhengting jinyanke ???????? (Opium Prohibition 
Service of the Guangdong Ministry of Finances). From July 1929 to December 1929, it was 
named in a more cryptic way that nonetheless expressed an affiliation to the Ministry of 
Finance: the Caizhengting diwuke ?????? (Fifth Service of the Ministry of Finance) 
(Huazi ribao, June 6, 1928; Chen Dayou 1963, 68; Yuehuabao, July 12, 1929). 
As under the Ten-Year Plan, smoking permits became an important part of the system 
(attached to the jinyan tiaoli, a whole set of regulations—jinyan lingpai zhangcheng ???
???—was devoted to this question). Smoking permits were meant to be a more humane 
way to help opium smokers quit by letting them regularly decrease their daily dose. Every 
addicted smoker (you yapianyinzhe ?????) had to state his daily consumption, along 
with other information (such as name, age, and address). The permit fee was modest and in 
proportion to daily consumption (10 yuan a year if the person smoked more than 6 qian a 
day, 5 yuan if the person smoked from 3 to 6 qian, and 1 yuan if the person smoked less than 
3 qian a day). In the following years, new regulations were issued. These regulations betray a 
concern for better control over the consumption of opium at home (where regulation was 
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more stringent than in the opium houses, where no permit was required). In the 1930s permit 
holders were compelled to purchase a certain amount of opium per month in order to 
minimize the possibility of their consuming smuggled opium at home. The permits were used 
to make money by heavily taxing wealthy smokers (in 1929, the most expensive permit, 
tebiezheng, enabled its bearer to smoke any kind of opium anywhere, with the guarantee of 
being undisturbed by opium administration inspectors, but it cost an exorbitant 100 yuan per 
month). Finally, a temporary (daily) permit could be purchased to gain the right to smoke in 
places like brothels, hostels, and restaurants: this option was aimed at controlling 
consumption in these locations, as well as collecting extra revenue.31 
 
Toward a More Sophisticated System (1926–1936) 
Song Ziwen’s Action and Its Legacy 
The legalization of opium had the advantage of enabling the authorities to organize 
the management of opium in a more bureaucratic (i.e., rational) way. The first regulations 
that appeared in the wake of the 1924 opium legislation were quite rudimentary. Over the 
years, more and more comprehensive regulations were issued to ensure the smooth running of 
the opium monopoly. It is not possible to deal with them at length in this article, but it is 
necessary to underline the role of the Harvard-trained businessman and politican Song Ziwen 
(then in his early thirties) in this regard. Song Ziwen skillfully reorganized the concrete 
aspects of the Guangdong opium monopoly. The “Regulations regarding the special permit 
granted by the Ministry of Finance for the transportation and sale of raw and prepared 
opium” (???????????????????) and the “Provisional regulations of 
the Ministry of finance regarding the permits for transportation of raw and prepared opium”   
(?????????????????), declared on October 28, 1926, are examples of 
comprehensiveness and precision (Ma 1998, 829–832). These regulations testify to Song 
Ziwen’s larger commitment to rationalizing and centralizing the collection of all fiscal 
resources. Most of the time, Song Ziwen did not suppress the tax collection method of 
farming (Remick 2004, 57, 78–88), which was then widely preferred, but he improved the 
method for selecting farmers and pressed for competition in the auctioning process (Yang 
2001, 27–35). In the case of opium, Song came up with a combination of farming and 
administrative control. Farmers (and their subfarmers) took care of the complete distribution 
network. There was no farming en bloc: each farmer was granted a task, such as transporting 
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opium from a producing region or conducting the wholesale trade of opium in a given area, 
and they operated under the tight control of official agencies. 
Song successfully addressed one of the major challenges the opium administration 
had to face when legalization became effective: smuggling. He certainly benefited from the 
fall of Liu and Yang, enthusiastic smugglers whose military strength placed them beyond the 
reach of the opium administration. Yet opium was not a bulky item, and Guangdong had 
many connections by water with the producing provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou. 
Smuggling opium was still relatively easy and tempting, because it could generate huge 
profits. Smuggled opium could efficiently challenge legal opium, because it was much 
cheaper and easy to mix with legal opium. 
In the long run, the main tactic used to curb smuggling was the quota system. One can 
go so far as to say that it became the backbone of the opium administration system. As 
previously noted, smokers had to hold a permit to smoke at home and had to purchase a 
minimum amount of opium each month. But the system extended to opium brokers, who 
were compelled to sell a certain quota of legal opium per month corresponding to the size of 
the potential market to which they were granted the right to sell. If they did not reach the 
quota, they were fined. 
Smuggling was also a concern when it came to poppy cultivation. Like his 
predecessors, Song prohibited planting in Guangdong and tried to never use local opium for 
supplying the monopoly, because the climate was unfit for growing poppies: Guangdong 
could yield only very poor-quality opium. But since the sole districts suitable for growing 
poppies were located near Chaozhou in a region where the hold of provincial authorities was 
precarious, it was safer to rely exclusively on opium from Yunnan and Guizhou along the 
Xijiang.32 Song installed a series of checkpoints on the river to guarantee better control 
(Slack 2001, 77–79). 
As a whole, Song was successful in curbing smuggling. His actions are clearly 
important: after 1928 the Guomindang drew on its experience as a Guangdong-based power 
and put into place the same kind of organization at the national level.33 
 
The Great Increase in Opium Revenues 
Song Ziwen’s reorganization also led to a sharp increase in opium revenues. It is a 
complicated task to evaluate the revenues derived from opium during the period from 1923 to 
1936 in terms of both value and percentage. The origins of the estimates provided by some 
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witnesses were never made explicit, but they all agree that Song Ziwen succeeded in 
increasing opium revenues.34 Of the few official sources available, one provides figures that 
corroborate these testimonies (table 1): 
 
Table 1. Guangdong Province Opium Revenues from 1926 to 1932 (unit: yuan ? (??). 
 
1926 5,252,978 
1927 6,720,000 
1928 7,416,000 
1929 7,409,664 
1930 7,764,013 
1931 8,011,738 
1932 8,662,025 
Source: Guangdongsheng caizheng jishi, 1912–33 [A survey of the finances of Guangdong 
province, Canton] (1934), as quoted in Guomindang Guangdongsheng dangbu Jinyandu 
zhuankan (1936, 35–36).  
 
As a percentage of Guangdong’s overall revenues, the South China Morning Post estimates 
that opium contributed 24 percent (HK$7.6 million out of HK$32 million) for the year 1929, 
which seems reliable.35 Opium revenues probably reached their peak during the Chen Jitang 
era, a period when it was widely believed that Chen could derive HK$1 million per month 
from opium. Estimates as to their proportion of the province’s revenue varied from 18 
percent to 38 percent.36 
 
The Opium System under Chen Jitang 
After the completion of the Beifa, Guangdong remained under the control of Nanjing 
for three years, until 1931. The opium laws introduced during this period were more or less 
the same as those enacted in Nanjing. In 1931, an anti-Jiang movement unfolded in 
Guangdong after Jiang Jiechi (Chiang Kai-shek) put Hu Hanmin under house arrest in late 
February. Chen Jitang (then the commander of the Guangdong army) seized this opportunity 
to assert his leadership over Guangdong (see figure 2).37 The province would again enjoy a 
great deal of autonomy during the five years of Chen’s warlord-style regime. As a whole, the 
opium system kept the same features inherited from the Song Ziwen period during these 
years,38 with two notable changes. 
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Figure 2. Chen Jitang in the late 1920s or early 1930s (no later than 1931). Source: Who’s 
Who in China (1931, 46).  
 
The first change took place in the early 1930s: opium houses became a crucial 
element in controlling the system. All of the published laws either explicitly forbid or failed 
to mention opium houses, because they were an especially sensitive issue (Jinyan tiaoli, 
August 1, 1925, article 7). They represented the most visible manifestation of the drug; as 
such, they were a particular concern for anti-opium activists and public opinion. Reading the 
laws, one has no sense that opium houses existed all over the place during the period (there 
were about 350 in Canton during the mid-1930s).39 If opium houses had remained relatively 
free of administrative interference during the first years of the monopoly, a new effort was 
made to ensure stricter control over them in the early 1930s. They were, for example, denied 
the right they had so far enjoyed to boil opium on their premises, in order to avoid the 
“cutting” of official opium with smuggled opium or other substances, a practice that was 
once universal and an “open secret” (gongkai de mimi ?????) (Minguo ribao, July 27, 
1931). Instead, the opium houses were now required to sell the official brand in sealed boxes 
containing the exact quantity the customer wanted to smoke (Xianggang gongshang ribao, 
June 19, 1935), to abide by quotas, and to sell a certain amount of opium per day 
(Yuehuabao, June 7, 1930; June 10, 1930; July 3, 1933; August 20, 1933). Moreover, new 
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taxes were levied on them, including a monthly license fee and fees proportional to the 
number of opium sets available for consumers’ use (Yuehuabao, February 7, 1930). 
I have pointed out the potentially deceptive nature of the laws and, by contrast, 
underlined the revealing nature of more matter-of-fact regulations. Yet the potential 
usefulness of these regulations for deciphering the reality of the situation should not be 
painted too optimistically. A poster kept in the Guangdong Archives displaying a set of 
regulations pertaining to inspections is a good case in point. This poster was probably 
intended to be displayed in opium houses; yet even in this set of regulations, absolutely no 
explicit reference is made to opium houses; instead, it allegedly dealt with “private 
dwellings” (minjufangshi ????).40 One point was especially crucial: if authorities had 
reason to suspect an opium house of illegal activities (like the selling of adulterated or 
smuggled opium) and wanted to investigate, agents from the Guangdong Opium Suppression 
Office, formed on December 1, 1929, had to be accompanied by members of the official 
police forces. Several news items published in the Canton press testify to the fact that the 
rulers of opium houses were perfectly aware of their rights in that matter and rebuffed agents 
who would not abide by this regulation (Yuehuabao, October 1, 1933; June 27, 1934). The 
reason for this measure was simple: the Guangdong jinyanju wanted to avoid extortions—in 
particular, false accusations and blackmailing that could very well result from its own 
unscrupulous agents (most of whom enjoyed the reputation of being shady characters) (Chen 
1963, 126; Huazi ribao, June 12, 1928). But the authorities were too embarrassed to 
straightforwardly state that they were actually concerned with the protection of the infamous 
opium houses. 
The second innovation to take place under the rule of Chen Jitang was that the 
Guangdong jinyanju, instead of being placed under the authority of the Ministry of Finances, 
was now under the firm grip of Huo Zhiting, a questionable character who had an impressive 
command over gambling and opium operations in Guangdong (Renjianshi 38:19, October 20, 
1935; Wei 1964, 111) (see figure 3). But once again, he did not control the complete 
distribution network and still used subfarming.41 Huo maintained a low profile, never 
appearing as head of the Guangdong jinyanju.42 
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Figure 3. One of the rare existing pictures of Huo Zhiting (on the right). The other men are 
important managerial staff of the Guangdong jinyanju (from left to right: Chen Wenfu, Chen 
Yukun, Wen Zhongsheng). Source: Xianggang gongshang ribao, March 17, 1936. 
 
The Influence of the Six-Year Plan on Guangdong 
Jiang Jieshi used the Six-Year Plan to financially weaken local warlords who 
challenged his power. For example, by redirecting the opium routes connecting some of the 
main provinces of poppy production (Yunnan, Guizhou) to the Lower Yangzi regions (with 
its huge consumption markets) (Marshall 1976, 26–27; Zhu, Jiang, and Zhang 1995, 147), he 
deprived the new Guangxi clique warlords of the transit taxes they levied along the Xijiang, 
an important source of income for them (Burton 1933a, 1933b). 
But this is not the whole story. Jiang Jieshi speculated widely on the national 
consensus about the need to eradicate opium. By organizing a complete and credible plan of 
opium suppression, the Nanking government established itself as the only legitimate authority 
in that regard. Jiang himself, as a leader, benefited from the Six-Year Plan, as the propaganda 
that accompanied it cleverly suggested that he was the heir of Lin Zexu (Paulès 2007, 207–
209). Also worthy of attention is the fact that the new opium laws were in tune with the 
international commitments of China. Jiang received praise from the League of Nations for his 
new opium policy, thereby increasing his political stature.43 
Historically, it has not been uncommon for the law to be used as a tool by a 
centralizing power struggling with centrifugal forces. For example, during the late medieval 
age, King Philippe le Bel of France used the right of appeal to the Paris Parliament to assert 
his authority over parts of his kingdom that were under the domination of powerful barons 
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(Favier 1978, 93–94). Guangdong is an excellent example of how national laws enacted by 
the Nanjing government regarding the Six-Year Plan seriously challenged the legitimacy of 
local autocrats like Chen Jitang. 
In the flow of official publications aimed at celebrating the achievements of the Six-
Year Plan, the absence of Guangdong Province (as well as Guangxi) was glaring.44 This was 
unbearable to the Guangdong intellectual elites. They soon urged Chen Jitang to take similar 
action.45 Undoubtedly, in Chen Jitang’s eyes, enforcing the Six-Year Plan in Guangdong 
would have meant a serious breach in his autonomy. So in late 1935, he made an attempt to 
launch his own five-year anti-opium plan (also aimed at suppressing gambling). The program 
consisted of inquiring about the situation regarding opium and “organizing a counting of the 
smokers” (juxing dengji ????) (in 1936) and then making plans according to the 
outcome of the inquiry (in 1937). 1938 would be devoted to promulgating anti-opium 
regulations, forbidding the opening of new opium dens, starting to produce “nonaddictive 
opium” (zhizhi wuyin xishi yapian ????????), and reducing the quantity of opium 
consumed by smokers (1939). By the final year, 1940, complete prohibition was to be 
enforced (Judu yuekan 95:20–21 [December 1935]). To say the least, this plan was vague and 
unconvincing. It is important to observe that the projected suppression campaign was 
supposed to end in 1940, the same year as the Nanking Six-Year Plan: obviously Chen’s aim 
was to show that Guangdong’s anti-opium action was not lagging. There would be more 
projects of this sort in the last months of Chen Jitang’s rule in Guangdong. But all convey the 
same impression of being mere gestures attempting to save time, and nothing concrete came 
out of them (Paulès 2010, 131–133). 
It is generally accepted that the death of Hu Hanmin (who had since late 1931 taken 
residence in Hong Kong and provided moral support to Chen’s regime) on May 12, 1936, 
was decisive in depriving Chen Jitang of his legitimacy and led to his fall two months later. 
Even if it is difficult to state the extent to which opium politics also undermined Chen’s 
legitimacy, it seems certain that they did so. 
 
Conclusion 
The Guangdong authorities faced a dilemma regarding opium during most of the 
period from 1912 to 1936. On the one hand, this substance was considered a symbol of 
China’s weakness and backwardness and its suppression was deemed a priority. But on the 
other hand, opium taxes were an indispensable source of fiscal income. 
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Before 1924, the authorities tried to overcome this dilemma either by enforcing an 
opium prohibition or by secretly deriving profit from opium traffic, but without granting it 
legalization (the monopoly of Long Jiguang in 1915 and 1916 was an exception). The year 
1924 was a turning point, as Sun Yat-sen decided to legalize the drug. The authorities then 
openly ruled an opium monopoly but tried their best to come out with “acceptable” opium 
regulations. Laws were necessary tools, as some degree of official implication was deemed 
necessary for better control over the management of opium and to derive more revenue from 
it. Regulations became more accurate and comprehensive and proved successful in increasing 
opium revenues. Yet the Guangdong monopoly never took the shape of government control 
over all facets of the circuit. Traditional tax-farming arrangements with local opium 
merchants (though under stricter supervision) remained the core of the opium monopoly. 
Considering the period as a whole, the dichotomy between warlords and non-warlords 
seems irrelevant. Power holders who can rightly be labeled “warlords,” like Long Jiguang 
(from 1913 to 1915) and the old Guangxi clique, profited from opium, but in a rather limited 
and discreet way, as they didn’t dare legalize it. It was the allegedly progressive regime of 
Sun that enacted legalization. Moreover, regarding matters related to opium, continuity 
prevailed between the Guomindang and Chen Jitang during the period from 1924 to 1936. 
As to the relation between central and local opium laws, this article shows the lasting 
influence of the 1906 Ten-Year Plan, which remained a strong paradigm during the whole 
period in question. In several instances, features of the Guangdong opium laws were directly 
inspired by the Ten-Year Plan, most notably the yearly time frame and the distribution of 
smoking permits. 
Just like other power holders, warlords had to be concerned about public opinion.46 
This article reveals that the Nanking regime used the Six-Year Plan (1934–1940) as a way to 
delegitimize the regime of Chen Jitang and deprive it of the considerable public support it 
enjoyed in Guangdong. It is important, therefore, to underscore that central and local laws did 
not simply coexist but sometimes actually competed with one another. This is a crucial and 
overlooked part of the struggle between Nanking’s and China’s centrifugal forces. 
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Notes 
 
1  The first attempt to deal with opium laws on a truly scholarly basis helped establish this   
trend, as it deliberately focused on central government laws, even while paying some 
attention to the provincial-level implementation of the Ten-Year Plan (Yu 1934, 1, 
139–146). 
2  During the nineteenth century, the general opinion in China regarding opium was 
negative, but the issue was at least up for debate. In that regard, the last decade of the 
nineteenth century represented a turning point: thinkers like Liang Qichao or Yan Fu 
considered opium to be one of the main causes of China’s weakness and a source of 
shame (guochi ??) for the country. Along with other practices, like foot binding or 
prostitution, opium smoking became a way to elaborate on the plight of China. The 
opium smoker dozing on his couch became a metaphor of China as the sick man of 
Asia. This was one of the main reasons for the Qing’s commitment to eradicating 
opium. 
3  For example, the beginning of Article 2 of the May 1911 agreement between China and 
Great Britain over the matter reads as follows: “The Chinese Government have adopted 
a most vigorous policy for prohibiting the production, the transport, and the smoking of 
native opium, and His Majesty’s Government has expressed their agreement therewith 
and willingness to give every assistance” (FO 228/2444). The Chinese version may be 
found in Yu (1934, 259). 
4  Yan Xishan is the most famous for his anti-opium action in Shanxi, the province under 
his control (Harrison 2006, 163–173; Wang Hongbin 1997, 371).  
5  Guangdong gongbao ????, no. 124 (December 12, 1912), no. 163 (February 13, 
1913); clippings from the Canton press, as translated in the file OM GGI 65400.  
6  See FO 228/1869 (Intelligence report on Canton for the four months ending January 31, 
1913); OM GGI 65400 (Note from the Canton French consul to the Gouvernement 
Général de l’Indochine concerning the Revolution in Guangdong, August 10–17, 1912). 
7  See FO 228/1869 (Intelligence report on Canton for the four months ending January 31, 
1913); SCMP, March 8, 1913; April 24, 1913; and May 16, 1913.  
8  SCMP, September 4, 1913; Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of 
Customs (1914, 992); Guangdong gongbao, no. 370 (October 16, 1913).  
9  See FO 228/2461 (Report from the Canton English consul, April 23, 1915); FO 
228/2462 (Report from the Canton English Consul dated October 19, 1915); 
Huaguobao, April 8, 1915; June 17, 1915.  
10   This was indeed a rather Kafkaesque situation. A letter by John Jordan, the English 
Ambassador in China, dating May 1915 is illustrative: “The Governor of Kiangsi 
[Jiangxi] has defined his position with a touch of humour [sic]. He says that he has no 
objection to strangely labelled chests coming into his province as a curiosity, but he 
reminds all concerned that opium smoking is forbidden in Kiangsi and that off goes the 
head of any person who touches or tasted the forbidden article" (FO 350, Jordan 
Papers). 
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11  See FO 415 (Report of the Colonial Office dated 19 January 1916); FO 228/2462 
(Report from the Canton English Consul dated October 19, 1915); Statistical 
Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs (1914, 1050. 
12  National archives no. 2 (Nanjing), series no. 679 (maritime customs), file no. 32409, 
Canton current events and rumors, report dated April 25, 1916; file no. 3285–3399, 
letter dated April 25, 1916.  
13  Jindu tiaoli ???? (Opium prohibition rules) (January 16, 1924), article 7 (in Ma 
1998, 763).  
14  Caizhengbu jinyan zongchu jieyan yaogao zhuanmai zongju zuzhi zhangcheng ???
???????????????? (September 29, 1926) (in Ma 1998, 822–824).  
15  Caizhengbu jinyan zongchu jieyan yaogao zhuanmai zongju shoumai yaoliao zanxing 
guize ??????????????????? (September 29, 1926) (in Ma 
1998, 824–825).  
16  For more about Chen Jiongming, one of the key figures of early Republican 
Guangdong, see the biographies by his son, Chen (1999), and Duan, Ni, and Shen 
(2006).  
17  See, for example, Guangdong qunbao, September 21, 1921, and Minguo ribao, 
February 14, 1922.  
18  For an illuminating account of the so-called “betrayal” of Sun by Chen Jiongming, see 
Fitzgerald (1996, 147–154, 198–203).  
19  It was widely believed that the late 1922 defeat of Chen Jiongming had to do with his 
idealism regarding gambling and opium and his choice to enforce a policy of strict 
prohibition no matter what political risks were involved (Jarman 2001, n.p.). 
20  Slack (2001, 69) accurately notes that, the Guangxi government and Cang Zhiping in 
Xiamen also legalized opium during the same period (the first months of 1924). 
21  “Jinbushengjin ????, buru yujinyuzheng ??????, jiyi suode zhi kuan ??
????, wei beifa fei yun ????? ,” Guangzhou minguo ribao, December 17, 
1923. 
22  I have mentioned the elite consensus over the need to eradicate opium, which took root 
in the 1890s; the situation during the Republican period was the same (Paulès 2009, 
499). 
23  This was a slogan for the National Anti-opium Association (Zhonghua guomin juduhui 
???????), which was founded in 1924. Many examples can be found in 
Zhonghua guomin juduhui (1931). See also Judu yuekan ????, no. 8 (January 
1927), p. 6. 
24  For example, Jinyan dubanshu dingding zhaoshang ming tou jieyanyao fensuo 
zhangcheng [Regulations regarding the process for recruiting detoxification medicine 
merchants and retailers by the opium suppression superintendent’s office], Guangzhou 
minguo ribao, January 22, 1924; January 23, 1924.  
25  The extent of smuggling made it difficult to find someone willing to farm out the opium 
revenues. The main concern of the various heads of the jinyan dubanshu (opium 
suppression superintendent’s office), up to the middle of 1925 would be to release the 
grip of the mercenaries over the opium market (Guangzhou minguo ribao, February 25, 
1924; April 8, 1924; April 28, 1924; and September 2, 1924). 
26  This is not to say, of course, that they are fully reliable: a careful investigation into 
other sources, such as Canton and Hong Kong newspapers, anti-opium activists’ 
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surveys, collections of historical materials (wenshi ziliao), and diplomatic reports, is 
necessary.  
27  It was a clever move to hold Liu and Yang responsible, but, as has been stated, they 
were enrolled by Sun to drive Chen Jiongming (who had successfully enforced the 
prohibition of opium) out of Guangdong. Moreover, Liu and Yang were not the only 
ones to profit from opium between 1923 and 1925. Some local strongmen who were 
still faithful allies of the Guomindang in July 1925 (like Li Fulin) had done exactly the 
same (Paulès 2010, 82–93). 
28  One famous example of the political elites’ fascination with planning is the Fifty-Year 
Plan for national economic development issued by Sun Fo in 1928 (Kirby 2000, 141–
142).  
29  Of course, Chinese administrative circles had long known about gradual long-term 
policies—for hydraulic works, for instance—but such policies were not framed in a 
tight and regular timetable, reflecting a new perception of time that took shape during 
the Xinzheng (Bastid-Bruguière 2001, 41–54).  
30  This is true even of intellectual figures like Zhang Junmai, who were more inclined to 
take a critical stance toward the Soviet Union (Chi 1986, 147–149).  
31  Caizhengbu guanyu niding jieyan baozheng guize ????????????? 
(October 1925) (in Ma 1998, 815–816); Guangdong caizhengting gongbu jieyan 
baozheng guize ????????????? (May 1929) (in Ma 1998, 917–918); 
Xianggang gongshang ribao, June 15, 1935; June 17, 1935.  
32  MAE, Série Asie, 1918–1929, sous-série affaires communes, file no. 55 (Report by the 
Canton French Consul dated February 1924).  
33 For example, it is worth noting that the opium administration would remain under the 
authority of the Ministry of Finance up to the launching of the Six-Year Plan (it was 
then put under the authority of the Military Commission). 
34  Chen Dayou (1963, 125); MAE, Série Asie 1918–1929, sous-série affaires communes, 
file no. 56 (Letter from the French Consulate dated September 5, 1928); Xianggang 
gongshang ribao, August 3, 1928, quoted and translated in FO 371/13252.  
35  SCMP, August 6, 1929, quoted in MAE, Série Asie, 1918–1929, sous-série affaires 
communes, file no. 53 (Report by Lieutenant Laurin dated October 9, 1929). No more 
precise mention of the currency is made besides “dollar,” but I am assuming it is the 
Canton dollar. 
36  Estimating opium revenues and their part in the province’s fiscal income during this 
period is a complex issue discussed in detail in Paulès (2010, 126–127). 
37  For a detailed account of the 1931 anti-Jiang movement whereabouts, see So (1991, 
191–199).  
38  Interestingly, the Guangdong sugar monopoly created in June 1934 faced the same sorts 
of constraints, in particular intensive smuggling, and shared some of the main features 
of the opium suppression system (farming, subfarming, sales quotas) (Hill 2010, 148–
155).  
39  Yet some regulations concerning them appeared sometimes (see Guangzhou minguo 
ribao, February 25, 1924).  
40  Guangdong jinyanju bugao (Notice by the Guangdong Opium Suppression Bureau, 
dated December 7, 1934), GA, Series no. 2/2, file no. 78. 
41  MAE, Nantes, Pékin, Série A, file no. 155 (Report by the Canton French Consul dated 
December 15, 1932). 
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42  There is, nonetheless, an exception: for reasons I have been incapable of deciphering, 
Huo Zhiting decided to appear as vice-head (quite ironically) of the Guangdong 
Jinyanju (Xianggang gongshang ribao, March 17, 1936). For an account of Huo’s 
career, see Wu (1987, 325–333).  
43  MAE, Série Asie, 1930–1940, sous-série affaires communes, file no. 115 (Minutes of 
the 22nd Session of the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous 
Drugs).  
44  For example, see the periodicals Jinyan jinian tekan ?????? and  Jinyan 
banyuekan?????. 
45   See Judu yuekan 90:8 (June 1935); Huazi ribao (March 12, 1935); Xianggang 
gongshang ribao (March 26, 1935 and June 9, 1935).  
46  For example, Alfred Lin (2004) makes clear the fact that Chen Jitang used an elaborate 
welfare policy as a way of reinforcing his legitimacy. 
 
References 
 
Archival Sources 
Archives d’Outre-Mer (OM) (Aix en Provence, France) 
Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (MAE) (La Courneuve, France) 
 Série Asie, 1918–1929, sous-série affaires communes 
 Série Asie, 1930–1940, sous-série affaires communes 
Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (MAE) (Nantes, France) 
 Pékin, Série A 
Foreign Office (FO) (Kew, England) 
 FO 228: Consulates and Legation, China: General Correspondence, Series I 
 FO 371: Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906–1966 
 FO 415: Confidential Print Opium, reprinted as The Opium Trade 1910–1941, 
 Scholarly resources, 6 vols., 1974. 
Gouvernement général de l’Indochine (GGI), file 65400 
Guangdong Archives (Guangdong, China) 
 Series 2 
 Series 95 
Guomindang Guangdongsheng dangbu 
 Jinyandu zhuankan, 1936. 
National archives no. 2 (Nanjing, China) 
 Series 679 (maritime customs), file 32409, Canton current events and rumors, report 
dated April 25, 1916; file 3285–3399, letter dated April 25, 1916.  
Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs (Shanghai, China) 
 Maritime Customs, Returns of trade, and trade reports for the year 1914, Canton 
trade report. 
 
Newspapers and Periodicals 
China Weekly Review 
Guangdong gongbao ???? 
Guangzhou minguo ribao ?????? 
Guangdong qunbao ???? 
Huaguobao ??? 
Paulès 81 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 7 (June 2013) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-7) 
	  
Huazi ribao ???? 
Jinyan banyuekan????? 
Jinyan jinian tekan ?????? 
Jinyandu zhuankan ????? 
Judu yuekan ???? 
Judu zhoukan ?赌?? 
Minguo ribao ???? 
Renjianshi ??? 
South China Morning Post (SCMP) 
Xianggang gongshang ribao?????? 
Yuehuabao ??? 
 
Articles and Books 
Bastid-Bruguière, Marianne. 2001. “Jikan kaishaku to Nihon eikyô: Chûgoku kindai ni okeru 
kako, gendai, mirai no gainen” [Japanese influence over the perception of time: Past, 
present, and future in the Chinese thought about modernity]. In Seiyô kindai bunmei to 
Chûka sekai [Modern Western culture and the Chinese world], edited by Hazama 
Naoki, 41–54. Kyoto: Kyôto daigaku gakujutsu shuppankai. 
Baumler, Alan. 2007. The Chinese and Opium under the Republic: Worse than Floods and 
Wild Beasts. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Bernhardt, Kathryn, and Philip Huang. 1994. Civil Law in Qing and Republican China. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Bourgon, Jérôme. 2004. “Rights, Customs, and Civil Law under the Late Qing and Early 
Republic (1900–1936).” In Realms of Freedom in Modern China, edited by William 
Kirby, 84–112. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Burton, Wilbur. 1933a. “Remembered Days in Canton.” China Weekly Review, July 8, p. 
234. 
———. 1933b. “Tin and opium in the economy of Yunnan.” China Weekly Review, 
September 23, p. 148. 
Chen Dayou. 1963. “Yijiuerliu zhi yijiusansi nianjian de Guangdong jinyan” [Opium 
prohibition in Guangdong from 1926 to 1934]. In Guangzhou wenshi ziliao [Historical 
materials of Guangzhou], vol. 9, 118–131. Canton: Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi 
xieshang huiyi, Guangdongsheng Guangzhoushi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu 
weiyuanhui. 
Chen, Leslie H. Dingyan. 1999. Chen Jiongming and the Federalist Movement: Regional 
Leadership and Nation Building in Early Republican China. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Center for Chinese Studies. 
Chereparov, A. I. 1982. As Military Adviser in China. Translated by Sergei Sosinsky. 
Moscow: Progress Publishers. 
Chi, Wen-hsun. 1986. Ideological Conflicts in Modern China: Democracy and 
Authoritarianism. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California. 
Duan Yunzhang, Ni Junming, and Shen Xiaomin. 2006. Li you zhengyi de Chen Jiongming 
[Chen Jiongming: A controversial figure]. Guangzhou: Zhongshan daxue chubanshe. 
Favier, Jean. 1978. Philippe le Bel. Paris: Fayard. 
Fitzgerald, John. 1996. Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist 
Revolution. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Paulès 82 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 7 (June 2013) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-7) 
	  
Harrison, Henrietta. 2006. “Narcotics, Nationalism and Class in China: The Transition from 
Opium to Morphine and Heroine in Early Twentieth-century Shanxi.” East Asian 
History 32/33: 151–176. 
Hill, Emily. 2010. Smokeless Sugar: The Death of a Provincial Bureaucrat and the 
Construction of China’s National Economy. Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press. 
Hosoi Hajime. 1919. Shina o mite daia yûki [Looking at China: A travelogue of Greater 
Asia]. Tokyo: Seikeidô. 
Huang, Philip. 2001. Code, Custom, and Legal Practice in China: The Qing and the Republic 
Compared. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Jarman, Robert L., ed. 2001. China, Political Reports 1911–1960. Archives Editions Limited 
2: 366. Intelligence report of the Canton Consul for the quarter ending December 31, 
1922. 
Kirby, William. 2000. “Engineering China: Birth of the Developmental State, 1928–1937.” In 
Becoming Chinese: Passages to Modernity and Beyond, edited by Wen-hsin Yeh, 
137–160. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Lin, Alfred. 2004. “Warlord, Social Welfare and Philanthropy: The Case of Guangdong 
under Chen Jitang, 1929–1936.” Modern China 30 (2): 151–198. 
Ma Mozhen. 1998. 1729–1949 Zhongguo jindu shi ziliao [Archival materials on the history 
of drug prohibition in China]. Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe. 
Marshall, Jonathan. 1976. “Opium and the Politics of Gangsterism in Nationalist China, 
1927–1945.” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 8: 19–48. 
May, Herbert. 1927. Survey of Opium Smoking Conditions in the Far East. New York: 
Opium Research Committee of the Foreign Policy Association. 
Paulès, Xavier. 2007. “La lutte contre l’opium, panacée politique pour le Guomindang?” 
Vingtième Siècle 95: 193–217. 
———. 2009. “Opium in the City: A Spatial Study of Guangzhou’s Opium Houses, 1923–
1936.” Modern China 35 (5): 495–526. 
———. 2010. Histoire d’une drogue en sursis: L’opium à Canton, 1906–1936. Paris: 
Éditions de l’EHESS. 
Remick, Elizabeth. 2004. Building Local States: China during the Republican and Post-Mao 
Eras. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center. 
Rhoads, Edward. 2000. Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late 
Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928. Seattle: University of Washington 
Press. 
Slack, Edward. 2001. Opium, State and Society: China’s Narco-Economy and the 
Guomindang, 1924–1937. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. 
So, Wai-chor. 1991. The Kuomintang Left in the National Revolution, 1924–1931. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Tran, Lisa. 2009. “The Concubine in Republican China: Social Perception and Legal 
Construction.” Études Chinoises 28: 119–149. 
Wang Hongbin. 1997. Jindu shijian [A historical examination of drugs prohibition]. 
Changsha: Yuelu sushe. 
Wang Jinxiang. 2005. Zhongguo jindu shi [History of drugs prohibition in China]. Shanghai: 
Shanghai renmin chubanshe. 
Wei Gong. 1963. “Guangzhou duhai fantan, shanpiao, baigepiao” [The gambling scourge in 
Canton: Fantan, shanpiao and baigepiao]. Guangzhou wenshi ziliao 9: 62–94. 
Canton: Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi, Guangdongsheng Guangzhoushi 
weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui. 
Paulès 83 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 7 (June 2013) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-7) 
	  
———. 1964. “Bashi nian lai Guangdong de ‘jin du’ he kaidu” [Prohibition and legalization 
of gambling during the last eighty years in Guangdong]. Guangdong wenshi ziliao 16: 
103–118. Canton: Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi, Guangdongsheng 
weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui. 
Who’s Who in China. 1931. 4th edition. Shanghai: The China Weekly Review. 
Wu Xiangheng. 1987. “Wo suo zhidao de Huo Zhiting” [What I know about Huo Zhiting]. In 
Guangzhoushi zhengxie wenshiziliao yanjiuyuanhui, Nantian suiyue, Chen Jitang zhu 
yue shiqi jianwen shilu [The years in the south: A record of Guangdong province 
under Chen Jitang’s rule], 325–333. Canton: Guangdong renmin chubanshe. 
Xu, Xiaoqun. 2008. Trial of Modernity: Judicial Reform in Early Twentieth-Century China. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Yang Zhesheng. 2001. Guomindang jinrong zhi fu: Song Ziwen [The father of the 
Guomindang’s finances: Song Ziwen]. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe. 
Yu Ende. 1934. Zhongguo jinyan faling bianqian shi [The changing history of opium 
prohibition legislation in China]. Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju. 
Zhonghua guomin juduhui. 1931. Fandui yapian gongmai yanlun ji [A collection of opinions 
to oppose an opium monopoly]. Shanghai: Publisher unknown. 
Zhu Qingbao, Jiang Qiuming, and Zhang Shijie. 1995. Yapian yu jindai zhongguo [Opium 
and modern China]. Nanjing: Jiangsu jiaoyu chubanshe. 
 
